Abstract: Several studies as well as anecdotal evidence indicate that financial liberalization contributes to the likelihood that a financial crisis erupts. We focus on banking crises and ask whether explanations of crises can be improved by distinguishing among different types of financial liberalization. Using a recently updated new dataset of financial reforms for 42 countries between 1973 and 2002, we decompose liberalization into behavioral liberalization (credit and interest rate liberalization), competitive liberalization (equity market, capital account liberalization, and banks' entry and activity liberalization), and privatization. The interaction between liberalization and institutional factors such as strength of banks' capital regulation and supervision, and deposit insurance coverage is studied as well. Once these interactions are taken into account the generally positive association between financial liberalization and banking crisis disappears. Instead, the type of liberalization, type of country, level of deposit insurance coverage, and strictness of regulation matter for the relationship. Under a wide range of conditions, the likelihood of banking crises is relatively high at an intermediate level of liberalization in emerging markets in particular.
Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis

Introduction
Many countries liberalized their financial sectors during the 1980s and the 1990s with the objectives, in particular, of improving financial development and economic growth (Tornell et al, 2004; Bekaert et al, 2005) . However, financial liberalization is often followed by financial instability and is often considered a cause of banking crises Reinhart, 1999, Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996) . In this paper, we ask whether different types of financial liberalization affect the likelihood of banking crises to different degrees, whether the effects of liberalization depend on the strength of financial supervision and capital regulation, the existence of deposit insurance, and the quality of institutions in the liberalizing country, and whether these effects vary according to different country characteristics.
In our empirical analysis of the effects of financial liberalization on banking crises from 1973 through 2002 we use recently updated data from International Monetary Fund's Financial Reform Database. The database was originally coded by Abiad and Mody (2005) and then updated by Omori (2006) . The major advantage of this database is that it divides financial reform data from 42 countries into several dimensions. The extent of liberalization is specified in each dimension, and the data exist for a long time span beginning in 1973. Most existing studies that examine the effects of financial liberalization on banking crises are limited to the use of a 0/1 dummy in capturing the periods of non-liberalized and liberalized financial systems (for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2001; Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002; Noy, 2004) . These studies find similar results suggesting that liberalizing financial systems results in an increasing probability of banking crises. The disadvantages of using the dichotomous variable are that it does not reflect the extent of liberalization, nor the type of restrictions that exist or have been abolished. Some studies have attempted to improve measures of financial liberalization by constructing an index that captures "intensity of liberalization" or by using continuous economic variables as indirect proxies for liberalization. For example, Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) use the ratio of capital flows to GDP as a proxy for the extent of external liberalization. Other studies such as Bekaert et al (2005) use the intensity of equity market liberalization as defined by a measure of market capitalization. These variables reflect changes in economic outcome that may occur as a result of liberalization. Kaminsky and Schumukler (2003) and Abiad and Mody (2005) construct an index that captures both the intensity of and changes in policy with respect to financial liberalization. Kaminsky and Schumukler construct a financial liberalization index based on the liberalization of capital account, interest rate control, and equity market. The index has three levels: full liberalization, partial liberalization, and no liberalization. Their sample coverage is limited to 28 countries during the period of 1973-1999. We use the new Financial Reforms data, which are more comprehensive than other financial liberalization data, to examine the effects of financial liberalization on banking crises. The new database categorizes financial reforms into seven dimensions. Six of them refer to eliminations of credit allocation controls, interest rate controls, capital account controls, equity market controls, entry barriers and privatization while the seventh refer to enhancement of bank capital regulation and supervision. The intensity of each reform category is captured on a four-point scale: fully repressed, partially repressed, largely liberalized, and fully liberalized for the six dimensions of liberalization.
From this database we construct a simple aggregate index for the six categories to capture the degree of total financial liberalization. The six categories are also grouped into three types denoted behavioral liberalization (credit and interest rate liberalization), competitive liberalization (equity market, capital account liberalization, and banks' entry and activity liberalization), and privatization. The first dimension refers to banks' ability to set interest rate and credit amounts without regulatory constraints while the second dimension reflects competitive conditions within the banking sector and between banking and other sources of finance. The data for all dimensions of liberalization are dominated by changes towards greater liberalization although there are periods of reversals in some countries. In addition, one type of liberalization is often accompanied or followed by other types of liberalization. There are political as well as economic arguments for this link among types of liberalization. If the link is very strong in terms of timing, the correlation between the indexes for different types of liberalization will be high. Nevertheless, our objective is to analyze whether it is meaningful to distinguish among different types of liberalizing financial restrictions in explaining banking crisis probabilities. We also ask whether there is a nonlinear relationship between the level of liberalization and banking crises. Specifically, increased liberalization may increase the likelihood of banking crises at a diminishing rate or the likelihood of crisis may be particularly high at a particular level of liberalization.
Another objective of our study is to examine whether the commonly observed relationship between liberalization and banking crisis holds under different circumstances. We investigate whether the effects of financial liberalization on banking crises depend on banks' capital regulation and supervision (CRS), deposit insurance systems and the quality of domestic institutions. If capital regulation and supervision are effective it can be expected that liberalization can occur without serious consequences for the likelihood of banking crisis. The system of deposit insurance can also have an effect on the consequences of liberalization if high deposit insurance coverage is associated with relatively strong risk-taking incentives. We also divide the sample into different country groups based on country characteristics in terms of financial development and the extent of capital mobility. We expect that emerging markets and low financial development countries are more likely to experience a banking crisis when liberalizing the financial sector because these counties generally have low levels of skills in risk assessment, weak supervision, and more volatile capital flows.
In Section 2 we discuss the role of government in banking and potential costs and benefits of financial liberalization. The existing empirical literature on the effects of both domestic and international financial liberalizations on banking crises is reviewed in this Section. Hypotheses are developed in Section 3. Empirical methodology and data are described in Section 4. Results of the empirical tests are presented in Section 5. Conclusions and policy implications follow in Section 6.
The role of governments in banking and costs/benefits of financial liberalization
A financial system is an important driving force for growth in the economy. Banks dominate the financial system in large parts of the world. To ensure "safe and sound" banking, most governments have regulated and restricted banks' operations. Banking restrictions take many different forms. For instance, for fear that excessive capital inflows can promote unsustainable booms followed by economic contraction, governments implement capital controls. Financial repression in the form of controls on interest rates and credit allocation are two ways the government can raise funds at a relatively cheap interest rate instead of raising taxes (Giovannini and de Melo, 1993, Fry, 1997) . Governments also allocate credit to achieve certain economic policy objectives. Since governments in many countries have used banks to fund budget deficits and to achieve certain objectives, banks have long been treated as public utilities. For these reasons and for fear of bank runs in times of distress, the survival of banks has been implicitly guaranteed in many countries (Honohan, 1997) .
The analyses by Shaw (1973 ), McKinnon (1973 , and Beim and Calomiris (2000) show that financial repression results in reduced economic growth because banks have little incentive to explore new opportunities and to become innovative. Furthermore, savings are discouraged and credit is potentially misallocated. Artificially low interest rates make credit rationing necessary.
With high reserve requirement and direct credit allocation to certain industries and related parties, the funds available to the private sector may decline. Small-scale investors have to obtain funds in relatively expensive informal credit markets while large firms and established clients receive credit at favorable terms (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985) .
In response to the evidence of inefficiency of financial repression, changes in political structures and economic conditions (Abiad and Mody, 2005) , and pressures from trading partners, many countries have reformed their financial sectors by moving towards fewer financial restrictions, particularly during the 1980s and the 1990s. The important objectives of financial reform have been to enhance the efficiency of a banking system, improve the allocation of credits, stimulate savings and, indirectly, achieve a higher economic growth. Domestic (internal) financial liberalization typically includes the removal of interest rate controls and direct credit allocation schemes. It often includes allowing banks to expand the scope of their activities and privatizing state-owned banks to reduce political influences. Leaven (2003) finds that the financing constraints have been reduced for both large and small firms over time in liberalizing countries. As a result, differences in costs of borrowing among firms have been reduced. He also finds that financial liberalization reduces costs of asymmetric information in firms' choice of financial leverage.
International (external) financial liberalization refers to the removal of capital account controls by allowing the flow of funds in and out of the country. Desai et al (2006) find that capital controls discourage foreign direct investment (FDI) directly in some instances or indirectly, because multinational firms operating in a country face higher costs of borrowing locally than in international markets. Hence, the removal of capital control can lead to more FDI, which will bring in new technology and management skill.
Both external and internal financial liberalizations tend to improve the financial infrastructure (Schmukler, 2004) and bank governance. The benefits from reducing foreign bank entry restrictions is that foreign investors will monitor their banks' activities, and host governments have to adopt an international accounting standard, thereby increasing transparency. If foreign banks dominate the banking sector, governments are less likely to bail them out. A lower likelihood of bail out disciplines banks and reduces moral hazard.
The process of eliminating financial restrictions also involve costs, particularly during a transition period, and possibly more permanently if banks' risk-taking incentives are strong. DiazAlejandro (1985) argues that financial liberalization is destined to cause a crisis. There are also a number of financial crisis theories that associate free, unsupervised financial markets with crises. In particular, Minsky (1992) explains banking crises referring to three different kinds of financial transactions−hedging, speculation and Ponzi schemes. In a Ponzi scheme banks borrow or sell assets to repay interest. According to Minsky, speculation and Ponzi schemes may dominate the markets under some circumstances unless supervisors prevent this from happening. Wolfson (2002) later expands Minsky's theory of financial crises into the global context. During the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, for example, "too much" money flowed into emerging markets. Large capital flows into the Asian countries fueled expectations of further profits leading to greater inflows and the expansion of corporate debt collateralized by assets with ultimately inflated values. These theories describe how crises can arise in uncontrolled and unsupervised markets but they are not exact in specifying how different aspects of liberalization and government's involvement contribute to, or reduce, the likelihood of banking crises.
The association between financial liberalization and banking crisis has been found in several empirical studies (e.g. Williamson et al, 1998 , Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999 , Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2001 , Weller, 2001 , Eichengreen and Arterta, 2002 and Noy, 2004 . Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) focus on domestic financial liberalization by observing the date policy makers announce interest rate decontrols in 53 countries during the period 1980-1995. Using a simple 0/1 dummy as a proxy for interest rate control/decontrol periods, they find that financial liberalization is strongly and positively correlated with the probability of a subsequent banking crisis. Weller (2001) The mentioned papers indicates that there exists a number of arguments why the relaxation of interest rate and credit controls as well as the removal capital controls may increase the likelihood of crises. Financial liberalization creates new business environments for both bank managers and supervisors. Prior to financial liberalization, bank managers and staff become used to work within a controlled environment. Post-liberalization the poor performance of pre-liberalization portfolios becomes exposed (Alba et al, 2000 and Caprio et al, 2000) and new types of risk arise. If the managers and the supervisors are not familiar with the new environment, they cannot monitor banks' activities properly. As a result, over-lending or excessively risky lending may occur.
Another argument for costs of financial liberalization is that the eliminations of interest rate controls and direct regulation of credit can strengthen price competition, reduce profitability of banks and thereby increase the fragility of the banking system. Inefficient banks facing narrow profit margins would be more vulnerable to fluctuations in economic activity (Noy, 2004) .
However, an opposite argument is that increasing competition can contribute to greater efficiency and market discipline on banks' willingness to hold capital as a buffer.
In open economy environments banks' incentives and skills in risk assessment and management are challenged. Extensive guarantees of banks, or perceptions that failing banks will be bailed out, increase in the likelihood of financial inflows being invested in excessively risky projects, and inexperience can lead to financial resource misallocation. One possible consequence of a surge of inflows is a bubble (McKinnon and Pill, 1997) , and the removal of capital account restrictions increases the probability of capital reversals.
Other aspects of domestic financial liberalization have also been examined. For example, in studying the relationships among financial liberalization, financial crises, and economic growth, The implication of this overview is that different aspects of liberalization may have different effects on the likelihood of banking crises. Thus, to identify effects of one type of liberalization it is desirable to control for other types of liberalization. In addition, the benefits of liberalization can be accompanied by risks if incentives in the market place do not encourage prudence and supervision.
Excessive risk taking can be exacerbated by far-reaching guarantees of banks, low levels of skills in risk assessment, weak governance in banks and lax supervision.
Data for types of financial liberalization
Data on liberalization of different types of restrictions and supervision are taken from Omori The dimensions (1)- (6) is measured on a scale from 0 to 3 where 0, 1, 2 and 3 represent fully repressed, partially repressed, largely liberalized, and fully liberalized. For banking regulation and supervision (CRS) the scale goes from unregulated and unsupervised (0), through weakly regulated and supervised (1), largely regulated and supervised (2), to strongly regulated and supervised (3).
The description of each dimension is reported in the Data Appendix.
Since there is substantial correlation among the dimensions of liberalization (see Panel a, Table 2 ), we combine these dimensions to create three types of liberalization. We argue that interest rate-and credit controls are nearly equivalent since freedom to allocate credit without freedom to set interest rates on loans implies that the allocation will be determined by the interest rate structure.
To enjoy faster growth, many governments have initiated liberalization by allowing banks to set interest rates or to allocate credit more freely or both. Credit and interest rate controls of all kinds can be viewed as restrictions on banks actions and behavior. Thus, we combine the first two dimensions of liberalization, eliminations of credit and interest controls, into one type denoted We consider government ownership a third separate type of restriction. Liberalization in this dimension is denoted Privatization.
iii) Privatization = (6) The correlation between the first two types of liberalization remains high as shown in Table   2 raising questions about the possibility of distinguishing between effects of types (i) and (ii). We return to this issue.
Hypotheses and model specification
We test the effects of financial liberalization using both a Financial Liberalization index The behavioral liberalization (credit and interest rate controls) may increase the likelihood of banking crises, because there is a learning period before risk assessment and risk management 1 We also run regressions by including all three components instead of the aggregate variable of Competitive Liberalization after controlling for the rest of other types of liberalization. The p-value of the Wald Chi-square test for the equality between the two of the coefficients is higher than 0.10, indicating the effects among these three components on banking crises cannot be identified. Thus, it is likely that not much information is lost when using Competitive Liberalization index instead of (3), (4) and (5) Competitive liberalization and privatization may also increase the likelihood of banking crises. Liberalizing competitive restrictions can increase the risk exposure and the vulnerability of the banking systems. We also hypothesize that privatization increases the likelihood of banking crisis because governments' willingness to support banks in distress is likely to decline.
We also test the hypothesis that the effect of liberalization on the likelihood of banking crises is nonlinear and possibly strongest at an intermediate level of liberalization. Generally, credit allocation should become more efficient as management skills develop in a fully liberalized environment. Bank governance improves and bad loans decline. Therefore, we should expect that increased liberalization will be associated with an increase in banking crisis probabilities at a diminishing rate and the banking crisis probability may even decline as liberalization becomes more complete. More specifically, we hypothesize in contradiction to Hypothesis 1 that the relationship between banking crises and financial liberalization has an inverted U-shaped.
Hypothesis 2: There is a degree of partial liberalization at which the probability of banking crisis is at a maximum.
In Figure 1 , we show the frequency of banking crises at different levels of each of the three types of liberalization. Data for banking crisis episodes are taken from Caprio et al (2005) . The frequency of banking crises is calculated by taking the total number of crisis episodes under a particular level of each type of liberalization divided by the total annual observations in the sample under that particular liberalization level. Figure 1 seems to support our contention of an inverted U-shaped relationship since the frequency of banking crises is lower at relatively high extents of liberalization.
An additional consideration is that effects of liberalization could depend strongly on the effectiveness of bank capital regulation and supervision, institutional quality, and the extent of deposit guarantees behind banks. This leads to the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3a. Stronger capital regulation and supervision and higher institutional (legal and political) quality in a country are expected to weaken the positive association between financial liberalization and the likelihood of banking crises.
Hypothesis 3b. The stronger the protection of bank depositors and other creditors of banks, the greater is the likelihood that liberalization will result in a banking crisis.
Hypothesis 3a is straightforward as bad loans should be relatively small and the banking systems should be less vulnerable to a crisis in countries with the presence of strong regulation and supervision during liberalized periods assuming that strong regulation amounts to effective regulation. Regarding Hypothesis 3b many recent studies in the literature find that a deposit insurance system that provides high coverage of deposit protection strengthens banks' risk-taking incentives by reducing market discipline. We therefore expect that banking crises will be more likely in countries that provide high deposit insurance coverage during liberalized periods.
Additional hypotheses with respect to the interactions between, for example, behavioral and competitive restrictions could be formulated, but the high degree of correlation between different types of liberalization data prevents us from testing potentially interesting interactions.
Our hypotheses are tested for both the entire sample of 42 countries and each of three country groups that have different characteristics in terms of financial development and the extent of capital mobility. The three groups of countries that we study are: high financial development countries, low financial development countries, and emerging market economies.
2 The latter two groups, in particular, are partly overlapping.
Countries with high (low) financial development are characterized by their ratios of domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP. The high (low) development country has the ratio above (below) the mean ratio in the sample. The sample of emerging market economies is drawn from Fischer (2001) We expect that the effects of financial liberalization on the incidence of banking crises are stronger for emerging market-and low financial development countries. Generally, these countries have less experience with risk management, relatively weak financial regulation and supervision, weak market discipline, and more volatile capital flows.
We test the above hypotheses using Logit estimation based on the following initial model specification:
where BC is an onset of a banking crisis dummy, which takes a value of one in the first year that crisis erupts, and 0 if there is no crisis. Macro is a standard set of macroeconomic control variables used in the reviewed literature.
They include the real GDP growth rate, the ratio of current account to GDP, the ratio of money supply to international reserves, the growth rate of the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking sector to GDP, the inflation rate, the Northern interest rate 4 and a currency crisis dummy. The currency crisis dummy is included because there are studies that find a strong relationship between currency and banking crises (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) . The descriptive statistics of the variables used in regressions are reported in Table 1 . The descriptions and sources of these variables are reported in the Data Appendix.
We consider several ways to reduce any source of bias arising from unobserved country characteristics in the panel data model and from simultaneity caused by reverse causality between liberalization and banking crisis in particular. In the reported regressions (Tables 3-6) Table 3 and those from the random-effects Logit model reported in Appendix C). An instrumental Logit regression is also an alternative way to eliminate the endogeneity bias. Since there is no ideal instrument for financial liberalization we undertake alternative approaches to deal with reverse causality concerns.
We inspect individual crisis episodes in our sample and observe changes in the level of financial liberalization after the eruption of banking crises. We do not find a significant pattern of reversal of liberalization after the crisis onset. 5 In unreported regressions, we also regress the aggregate index of liberalization (with a 0-18 scale) on the onset of banking crisis dummy and other macroeconomic control variables using the Order Logit model. The p-value for the banking crisis dummy is about .6. These investigations suggest that our reported regressions based on the Logit model are not driven by the endogeneity.
We also consider using different lags of liberalization in estimations since the effects of financial liberalization on banking crises may take longer than one year to appear. However, for each of three types of liberalization the levels up to five years are very highly correlated (see Table   2 , panel b). Thus, we will not try to identify an exact lag structure and duration of the effects of liberalization. Tables 4 for Total FL and in Table 6 for the different types of liberalization.
Empirical results
Tables
Column 1 in (3), (5) and (7) However, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is a degree of liberalization below a fully liberalized level that maximizes the probability of banking crisis in these countries.
The coefficients for CRS are negative and strongly significant in HIGHFIN-and EMG countries but the significance level of CRS for LOWFIN countries is only .25. The increase in probabilities of crises as a result of increased DI Coverage is strongly significant for HIGHFIN countries, insignificant for LOWFIN countries, and close to significant (.11) for EMG countries.
The negative impact of institutional quality appears significant only for HIGHFIN countries but it is possible that the variation in this variable within the other country groups is low. Thus, the effect of financial liberalization on the likelihood of banking crisis depends on at least one of these institutional factors in all country groups.
In the LOWFIN and EMG countries, the likelihood of banking crises seems to be independent of financial liberalization at low values of CRS, DI Coverage and GDP/capita. As CRS and DI Coverage become high there seems to be an intermediate level of financial liberalization that maximizes the likelihood of banking crises. The insignificant interaction between Total FL and GDP/Cap in combination with a positive interaction between GDP/Capita and (Total FI) 2 in EMG countries indicates that the higher GDP the stronger is the positive relationship between liberalization and banking crisis probability. CRS standing alone has a significantly negative effect while the coefficients for DI Coverage and GDP/Capita are not significant.
Within the HIGHFIN country group the coefficient for Total FL alone is now negative and significant. Thus, at relatively low levels of CRS, DI Coverage and GDP/Capita increased financial liberalization is associated with a relatively low probability of banking crisis. This negative relationship becomes increasingly strong as CRS and DI Coverage increase but increasingly positive as GDP/Capita increases. Thus, the only interactive variable that makes the relationship increasingly positive in both EMG and HIGHFIN countries is GDP/Capita.
These results are illustrated in Figure 2 . Panel A shows the relation between Total FL and the predicted probability of banking crises for different levels of strength of capital regulation and supervision (CRS) based on results in Table 4 . The EMG figure on the right is based on Column (8) while the HIGHFIN figure on the left is based on Column (6). We do not present a figure for LOWFIN countries since the results for these countries are similar to the results for EMG countries. In EMG countries the probability of banking crises increases over the whole range of Total FL only when regulation and supervision is at their weakest (CRS=0) as Hypothesis 1 suggests. As supervision and regulation strengthen (CRS=1 and 2), EMG countries are able to liberalize fully without increasing banking crisis probabilities. Instead, the maximum probability of a crisis occurs at an intermediate level of liberalization as suggested by Hypothesis 2.
The pattern for HIGHFIN countries is similar under weak supervision (CRS=0 and 1).
However, under relatively strong regulation and supervision (CRS=2 and 3) the lines become downward sloping indicating that increased liberalization reduces the likelihood of banking crises.
The results for HIGHFIN countries are, therefore, stronger than the prediction in Hypothesis 3a that higher CRS would weaken the association between liberalization and banking crisis. Overall, the results indicate that strong regulation and supervision allow countries to derive benefits of liberalization and reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis.
Panel B allows deposit insurance coverage (DI) to vary instead of CRS. At all levels of DI coverage and average values for other variables in EMG countries, the probability of banking crises reaches a maximum at an intermediate level of liberalization. As the coverage increases from zero to 5 and 10, the level of Total FL that maximizes the probability of crisis decreases but the maximum probability increases. If we associate increased DI coverage with stronger moral hazard incentives for risk-taking these results indicate that the stronger these incentives are the lower is the level of liberalization that maximizes the incidence of a crisis and the higher is the probability of In a separate set of regressions (not shown), we use the index of rule of law and an absence of corruption to proxy the institutional quality instead of GDP/CAP. The results remain the same.
The signs of the coefficients for these two proxies are similar to those of GDP/CAP. The interaction terms between total FL and rule of law/an absence of corruption are not significant for the LOWFIN and EMG groups, but significant for the HIGHFIN country group.
In Table 5 , using the same base model specification as in Table 3 Total FL is (Table 2a) is as high as .80, one can question whether independent effects of these two types of liberalization can be identified.
The results in Table 5 for CRS, DI coverage, and GDP/Capita are consistent with the results in Table 3 . CRS has a significant or nearly significant, negative impact in all country groups while DI coverage increases the likelihood of banking crises in the HIGHFIN group and GDP/Capita reduces the likelihood of banking crises across all groups but the level of significance is low.
Since Behavioral liberalization so far seems to have the strongest effect in all country groups we interact only this type with institutional variables in Table 6 . Including the interaction between
Behavioral liberalization in linear and quadratic forms with only CRS in Columns (1)- (4) we observe that the quadratic relationship appears significant for HIGHFIN countries at high levels of CRS. In Table 4 where liberalization was captured by Total FL, this relationship appeared to be relatively strong for LOWFIN and EMG countries but not for HIGHFIN countries. It can also be observed that Competitive liberalization now has a positive and significant effect in the EMG group while Privatization has a negative effect in both HIGHFIN and EMG countries. The significance level in the latter group is only .31, however.
Finally, we include interactions with DI coverage and GDP/Capita as well. The results within the HIGHFIN group for interactions with Behavioral liberalization as well as for stand alone variables are similar to the results for Total FL in Table 4 . As in Table 4 Table 4 . DI coverage and GDP/Capita standing alone are also significant with the same signs as in Table 4 reinforcing the result that Behavioral liberalization captures much of the same information as Total FL.
Considering the results for LOWFIN and EMG countries in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 , the signs for the interaction variables including Behavioral liberalization in linear and squared forms are similar to the signs for the interactions including Total FL in Table 4 but the significance levels in Table 6 are low. It is likely that the correlations among variables do not allow us to identify the many potential sources of influence on banking crises in this case. One indication of the problem of identifying effects of different types of liberalization as well as of interactions is that Competitive liberalization standing alone has a significant and positive coefficient when the interactions terms are included in Table 6 . This variable was not significant when interactions were not included in Table 5 . We will not push the results further here but note that effects of Behavioral and
Competitive liberalizations are not separated with any certainty. The effects of these two types of liberalization together are likely the drivers of the results for Total FL in EMG and LOWFIN countries above. Privatization, on the other hand, is less correlated with the other types of liberalization and with Total FL and needs to be analyzed separately. Our results indicate that increased privatization is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of banking crises.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in Tables 3-6 The pattern for high financial development countries is similar under weak supervision but under strong supervision increased liberalization reduces the likelihood of banking crises in these countries. Thus, one result that holds for all country groups is that strong regulation and supervision allow countries to derive benefits of liberalization at a relatively low likelihood of crises.
-25 -We hypothesized that greater deposit insurance coverage would strengthen a positive association between financial liberalization and banking crisis based on the premise that high coverage is associated with relatively strong risk-taking incentives. This hypothesis is only partially supported in emerging markets where greater coverage is associated a lower level of liberalization that maximizes the incidence of crisis and a higher maximum likelihood of banking crisis. At full liberalization, the level of deposit insurance coverage matters less in emerging markets. In countries with a high level of financial development, moral hazard incentives of high deposit insurance coverage seem relatively strong at the extremes of repressed and highly liberalized financial systems.
When distinguishing among three types of financial liberalization: behavioral liberalization, competitive liberalization, and privatization, we find that the results for behavioral liberalization are the most significant and similar to the results for the index for total financial liberalization.
Behavioral liberalization refers to the removal of interest rate and quantitative credit controls.
Competitive liberalization depends to a large extent on the absence of exchange controls and absence of entry restrictions. Few significant results appear for this type of liberalization but the high correlation between this type and behavioral liberalization makes identification of different effects difficult. Privatization is less correlated with the other types of liberalization and the impact of this type seems different. There are indications that increased privatization reduces the likelihood of banking crisis but this result is not robust.
Data Appendix:
A. Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
The Onset Banking Crisis
The onset of banking crisis dummy, which is equal to 1 in a first year of each banking crisis episode (both systemic and non-systemic banking crises), and 0 otherwise. A systemic banking crisis is defined as the situation when much or all of bank capital is exhausted, while a nonsystemic or smaller banking crisis is identified when there is evidence of significant banking problems such as a government intervention in banks and financial institutions.
Caprio et al (2005) GDP/Capita The log of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). World Development Indicator (WDI) GDP Growth Real GDP growth (annual %) WDI CA to GDP Current account balance (% of GDP) WDI
Domestic Credit Growth
The log difference of the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)
WDI
M2 to Reserve
The ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to gross international reserves
The log difference of GDP deflator WDI
Northern Interest Rate
The weighted average of the interest rate in Germany, USA, UK, Switzerland, France, and Japan. The weights are the fraction of debt denominated in the relevant currencies
Authors' calculation following Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) Currency Crisis A dummy of one for the periods that currency crises occur. We use the data for currency crisis episodes from Glick and Hutchison (2001) . For a sample of countries and time periods, which are not covered in their studies, we construct currency crisis index following their methodology. They construct the EMP index from a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and international reserve loss. A crisis is identified when the EMP index exceeds two times countryspecific standard deviation plus country-specific mean. The crisis window (whether the large value of the EMP is counted as the same or new crisis) is 24 months.
Glick and Hutchison (2001) and authors' calculation Interest Rate Liberalization
Elimination of Interest Rate Controls. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the following three questions: 1) Are interest rates subject to ceilings/floors or determined by the central bank? 2) Are interest rates allowed to float within a band or are partially liberalized? 3) Are interest rates determined at market rates?
Omori (2006) Credit Allocation Liberalization Elimination of Credit Controls and Excessively High Reserve Requirements. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the following three questions: 1) Are reserve requirements restrictive? 2) Are there minimum amounts of credit that must be channeled to certain sectors? 3) Are there any credits supplied to certain sectors at subsidized rates? (yes=1; no=0)
Omori (2006) Equity Market Liberalization
The liberalization of security market policy. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the following questions: 1) Has a country taken measures to develop security market? 2) Is a country's equity market open to foreign investors? (the answers for each question have a scale of 0-2).
Omori (2006) Entry & Activity Liberalization
Elimination of entry barriers. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the following three questions:1) To what extent does the government allow foreign banks to enter into a domestic market? 2) Does the government allow the entry of new domestic banks or have they eased branching restrictions? 3) Does the government allow banks to engage in a wider rage of activities? (yes=1; no=0) Omori (2006) Data Descriptions and Sources (continued)
Elimination of Capital Account Restrictions. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the following three questions: 1) Is the exchange rate system unified? 2) Does a country set restrictions on capital inflow? 3) Does a country set restrictions on capital outflow? (yes=1; no=0) Omori (2006) Privatization Reduction in State Ownership of the Banking Sector. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the percentage of the state ownership of banks (privatization = 3 if state ownership of banks is less than 10% and privatization = 0 if state ownership of banks is greater than 50%.
Omori (2006) CRS (Capital Regulation & Supervision)
Enhancement of prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector. This variable has a scale of 0-3, which is based on the following two questions: 1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard? (yes=1; no=0) 2) Is a banking supervisory agency independent from the executives' influence? (the answers to this question have a scale of 0-2).
Omori (2006 The dependent variable is the onset of banking crisis dummy. Macroeconomic control variables are included in regressions, but not reported. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Regressions are estimated using the logit model with robust and clustered standard errors within a country. *, ** indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. # indicates the coefficient value zero that falls outside one standard deviation of the estimate. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
For Sample, ALL = all sample, HIGHFIN and LOWFIN = high and low financial development countries, EMG = Emerging Markets The dependent variable is the onset of banking crisis dummy. Macroeconomic control variables are included in regressions, but not reported. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Regressions are estimated using the logit model with robust and clustered standard errors within a country. *, ** indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. # indicates the coefficient value zero that falls outside one standard deviation of the estimate. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Test for quality of coefficient is the Wald-Test.
For Sample, ALL = all sample, HIGHFIN and LOWFIN = high and low financial development countries, EMG = Emerging Markets 
